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Abstract—Electricity grids must cope with rising demand and
complexity in a changing world. Smart grid is a promising solu-
tion to address these challenges. Recently, Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) is proposed as an integral part of the
smart grid that collect and analyze the measurements of energy
consumption using the communication network that links the
smart meters. The cyber security issues in AMI become very
important to guarantee the trustworthiness of the AMI. In order
to achieve data confidentiality, privacy and authentication in
AMI, security measures using various crypto algorithms will be
needed, thus demand key distribution and management schemes.
Since the number of electric appliances and devices need to be
monitored in households and commercial facilities is large and
the devices may have limited computational power and storage,
thus novel key distribution and management schemes would
be indispensable for the success of securing AMI from cyber
attacks. In this work, we propose a light-weight key distribution
and management scheme tailored to AMI. Specifically, a group
ID based mechanism is proposed to establish the keys for a
large amount of entities with small overhead. Security analysis
is performed to evaluate the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid is incontestably the driving force
of the human well being as it involves in every domain of
our life. It consists of a complex connection system between
generating power plants and power consumers through trans-
mission and distribution networks spanning large geographic
area. The current power grid is aging and could not withstand
the electricity quality requirement for the next century as it
is. Smart grid is the key technology that will empower the
current power grid with the necessary tools using advanced
telecommunications and information technology [1]. It has an
overlay of a two-way digital communication infrastructure for
the purpose of real time information exchange within the grid.
Recently, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is pro-
posed as an integral part of the smart grid that collects and
analyzes the measurements of energy consumption using the
communication network that links the smart meters. According
to the smart grid system report of the US Department of
Energy, Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is receiving
the most attention in terms of planning and investment. In
2009, AMI comprises about 4.7% of all electric meters being
used for demand response. Approximately 52 million more
smart meters are projected to be installed by 2012 [2]. An
AMI includes software, hardware, communication networks,
customer-associated systems and meter data management soft-
ware. As the smart grid becomes reality, the cyber security
issues in AMI become very important as AMI is part of the
critical infrastructure of the smart grid. In order to achieve data
confidentiality, privacy and authentication in AMI, security
measures using various crypto algorithms will be needed, thus
demand novel key distribution and management schemes [3].
Several works have been done mostly in authentication for
AMI, such as [4], [5], [6]. However, most of them have not
addressed the key distribution and management in AMI. The
authors in [5] propose a device authentication mechanism and
key establishment scheme for smart grid Home Area Network
(HAN), but with few security properties. On the other hand,
the number of electric appliances and devices need to be
monitored in households and commercial facilities is large
and the devices may have limited computational power and
storage. These challenges demand novel key distribution and
management schemes for the success of securing AMI from
cyber attacks. Hence, in this work we propose a light-weight
key distribution and management scheme tailored to AMI.
Specifically, we focus on the HAN and design a group ID
based mechanism to establish both the pairwise keys and group
keys with small overhead. The schemes for key update and key
revocation are also discussed. Security analysis is performed
to evaluate the proposed method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The HAN
modeling and problem formulation is given in Section II. Sec-
tion III provides details on the proposed key distribution and
management solution. Security analysis is given in Section IV.
Related works and performance comparison are discussed in
Section V. Section VI contains the concluding remarks.
II. HAN MODELING AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Multiple communication technologies and standards will
coexist in different parts of the smart grid from the different
energy generation points all along the transmission, distri-
bution infrastructures to the homes where the electricity is
consumed. This results in a hierarchical communication infras-
tructure ranging from home area network (HAN) to building
area network (BAN), neighborhood area network (NAN), and
wide area mesh network (WAN) and the ubiquitous internet.
Electricity user is a major component of the smart grid.
The efficient management of energy demand relies on the
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interactive high data rate information exchange with the utility
through the smart meters that provide the end user many
valuable abilities, such as reducing peak demand by shifting
usage to off-peak hours based on the real-time price from
the utility; lowering total energy consumption with possible
restoration of its excess of energy back to the grid from
renewable energy sources or electric vehicle [7]. Wireless
communication technology avoids expensive deployment of
wired connections, and is by far the appropriate commu-
nication medium that will connect the individual homes to
the substations through a NAN centralized at a base station.
Short range wireless communication standards like Zigbee
(802.15.4) and Wifi (802.11) could be used for the smart meter
interface in the HAN. The last miles wireless broadband or
cellular network may interface the smart meters with the data
collection base station within the NAN [8].
Fig. 1. An example of a Home Area Network and an Outside Attacker.
Although wireless systems provide relatively cheaper and
flexible means for smart grid communications, they also suffer
from more vulnerabilities to cyber attacks compared to their
wired counterpart. For example, it is much easier to eavesdrop
on wireless communications due to its broadcast nature. The
main focus of this study is on the key distribution and man-
agement in a HAN. HAN is the part of the AMI that enhances
the aforementioned two-way communication infrastructure be-
tween end users and utility provider with a centralized gateway
access to the multiple appliances through the smart meter
for the purpose of monitoring the energy usage in real-time.
The extreme sensitivity of the information exchanged within
the HAN necessitates a strong security, privacy and integrity
mechanism without which the trustworthiness of the data will
easily be questionable by the utility provider as well as the
electricity user [9], [10].
Considering the smart appliances as end nodes, a HAN
could be modeled as a group of end nodes linked in a star
configuration to a gateway node that is in turn connected
to the smart meter. The short range wireless communication
standard like Zigbee interfaces all of them as well as the home
interface of the smart meter. As such, each equipment and the
smart meter are one-hop to the gateway. An attacker located
in the wireless range of the nodes can eavesdrop the wireless
communication within the HAN. The attacker may launch
various attacks on the HAN, such as impersonating as legit-
imate group member and intercepting the message between
devices, maliciously modifying the information contributed by
the legitimate devices. The communication structure of the
HAN and an outside attacker are shown in Fig.1.
In this paper, we focus on the outside attackers and possibly
compromised nodes, rather than a cheating customer who try
to access the meter configuration through cyber means or try
to modify the meter firmware as considered in [11]. In order
to achieve data confidentiality, privacy and authentication in
HAN, security measures using various crypto algorithms will
be needed, thus demand key distribution and management
schemes. The aim of this work is to provide a light-weight
key distribution and management scheme as the foundation for
other security measures such as various crypto algorithms and
protocols to guarantee the communication security between the
group of devices in the HAN as well as the HAN interface of
the smart meter.
III. PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT
We first consider the creation of pairwise symmetric keys
between the gateway and each end node. Then a shared group
key is derived from the pairwise keys. We also describe the
procedures for key update and key revocation.
A. Generation of Pairwise Symmetric Key
The notation of cryptographic operations are
• H(m): hash value of message (m);
• Ek(m): encryption of message (m) with key (k);
• Z∗q : a multiplicative group;
• q: a prime number, order of the group Z∗q ;
• a: a primitive root of q, generator of the group Z∗q .
For all x ∈ Z∗q = {i|1 < i q−1}, ax exhaustively represent
the group Z∗q in some permutation. As such, for any value
P ∈ Z∗q , there is a unique x such that P = ax; where x is the
discrete logarithm of P . It is computationally not feasible to
calculate x given P and a are very large.
Prior to the deployment, every device securely accesses a
Certification Authority (CA) to be loaded with the following
primitives: The device ID (serial number), the multiplicative
group parameters (Z∗q , q, a); and H (a well-defined crypto-
graphic hash function).
A hash function converts a large amount of data into a small
datum with the following properties: it is infeasible to find
a message giving its hashed value (one-way property), it is
infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash
value (collision resistance property). Consider the gateway
device, gw, and a neighboring device i of the group. Each
of them select a number xgw and xi from the group Z
∗
q ,
respectively, and proceed as follows:
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At the Gateway GW At Node I
Xgw = a
xgw Xi = a
xi
IDgw|Xgw IDi|Xi
hgw = H(IDgw|Xgw) hi = H(IDi|Xi)









































In the above scenario, the gateway and a neighboring node
select two random numbers xgw and xi in the multiplicative
group and create two public keys Xgw and Xi per Diffie-
Hellman (DH) scheme [12]. Firstly, they compute the hash
value of the key, concatenate to their respective identification
(e.g. serial number). Secondly, they exchange a message
made of a concatenation of their respective hash value, their
identification, and public key. After receiving the messages,
both devices will re-compute the hash value for the purpose
of message authentication that ensure the received messages
were not tampered. Then both the gateway and the device can
compute the symmetric key independently. They will exchange







The pairwise shared key will be used to encrypt any infor-
mation exchange between the gateway and the end node. The
same symmetric key exchange could be performed between
the gateway and all the devices in the HAN individually. The
HAN group key will result from an aggregation of these keys
as described next.
B. Group Key Generation
Now we derive the shared group key from the pairwise keys
generated in the previous section. Group key is generated on
an equal contribution basis from each and every legitimate
node of the group. The unauthenticated group key agreement
based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement is used as
primitive to the group key scheme like in [13], [14], [12], [15].
Suppose N denote the total number of devices including the
HAN smart meter interface. Let Gk be the group key for the
HAN. The gateway will first generate a symmetric key with
each and every device in the HAN as described in the previous
section. Then the gateway will aggregate all the symmetric







gw . . .K
N
gw
= ax1xgwax2xgw . . . axNxgw
= ax1xgw+x2xgw+···+xNxgw
= a(x1+x2+x3+···+xN )xgw
After that the gateway will use the individually shared se-
cret key to encrypt the group key and unicast the message:
messi = EKigw(Gk) to each corresponding device i in the
HAN including the smart meter HAN interface.
C. Key Update/Renewal
One of the important key management requirements that
arise after a network has been deployed is forward secu-
rity [16], i.e., if a node is captured and its secret material
compromised, an attacker should not be able to decrypt mes-
sages that were intercepted by the attacker in the past. Thus,
the distributed keys need to be updated/renewed periodically.
The pairwise key can be updated very often with little
overhead as follows: when two parties exchange an encrypted
message using the jth version of the key Kj , they replace their
key Kj by Kj+1 = H(Kj), and destroy Kj . H is a secure
hash function. If either or both parties are compromised, the
attacker only comes into possession of the most recent version
of the key and is unable to compute any previous version of
the key, due to the one-way property of H . This method thus
satisfies the requirement of forward security and incurs very
little computational overhead due to the efficiency of the hash
function and no communication overhead.
The group key can be updated when any pairwise key is up-
dated, however, it is not necessary to update the group key so
frequently and it is computationally expensive. Furthermore,
it may introduce synchronization issues that the end nodes
may end up with different version of the group keys due to
communication delay. Hence, we propose to use a timer based
scheme at the gateway that determines how often the group
key should be updated. When the timer expires, the gateway
re-compute the group key and broadcast through HAN. The
value of the timer should reflect the tradeoff between security
and overhead for computation and communications.
D. Key Revocation
It is not feasible to automatically detect a key compromise.
This can be done only by monitoring the HAN for suspicious
behavior. Two possible cases of key compromise can occur.
Either the group key or pairwise keys could be captured by
an attacker.
If the group key is compromised, a revocation process is
initiated by the CA and the gateway securely unicast to each
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and every end nodes a revocation message encrypted with the
corresponding pairwise keys. The format of the message is
messagei = EKigw(text).
If pairwise keys are compromised, the group key is used to
encrypt and securely broadcast the revocation message to the
corresponding end nodes as message = EGk(text).
The revocation text should clearly specify the node identifi-
cation as well as the compromised key in order to prevent any
possible denial of service attacks that the attacker could initiate
against the HAN by resending the revocation messages. In the
rare case that both the group key and some of the pairwise
keys are compromised, the gateway and the end nodes need to
reboot and start the process given in Section III-A and III-B.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Authentication
In the symmetric key agreement scheme, the gateway and a
neighboring node select two random numbers xgw and xi in
the multiplicative group and create two public keys Xgw and
Xi per DH scheme. A node that had not been loaded with the
group parameters will not be able to generate an acceptable
public key giving the hard discrete logarithm problem in the
multiplicative group. This provides the means to authenticate
the node that seek an agreement with the gateway.
B. Integrity
In the symmetric key agreement two devices compute
their hash values (hgw, hi) of the key concatenated to
their respective identification, where hgw = H(IDgw|Xgw),
hi = H(IDi|Xi). They then send to each other the mes-
sages (mgw, mi) made of a concatenation of their respective
hash value, public key and identification, where mgw =
hgw|IDgw|Xgw, and mi = hi|IDi|Xi. Both devices re-
compute the hash values. They validate the integrity of the
message if and only if the new hash value matches the values
received in the messages. As such, the integrity of the public
key exchange is ensured.
The procedure is repeated during the computation of
the shared key. Each device compute the symmetric key
(Kigw, K
gw
i ) using the public key (Xgw, Xi) received in the







sent to each other the messages (messgw, messi) containing
the hash values of their respective key with their identifica-
tion. They both re-compute the hash value and confirm the
message’s integrity and validate the symmetric key.
C. Privacy
The gateway proceeds the same way with all the devices
in the HAN and generates the group key as described earlier.
Each end node only knows its own pairwise symmetric key
and cannot deduce other’s symmetric key, although they share
the same group key. The group key will only be used by every
device to encrypt any broadcasting messages within the HAN,
thus ensure the privacy of each end node in the HAN.
V. RELATED WORK AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
There are several official documents regarding the security
requirements of AMI, e.g., [1], [3], [11]. These documents
identify key distribution and management as a critical step
for securing AMI. In the academic literature, there are a
couple of works on the authentication, data integrity and
key management in AMI. In [4], the authors propose an
in-network collaborative scheme to secure the data integrity
and authentication using cryptographic keys established in the
mutual authentications. In [6], the authors use information
theory cryptography to provide data security through a novel
scheme based on unconditionally secure authentication codes
(A-codes) having short authenticators. These works mostly
concern the authentication in HAN rather than key distribution
and management. The smart metering privacy issue is ad-
dressed in [17] by anonymizing the identity of high-frequency
metering data through an escrow service.
An authentication and key establishment mechanism for
HAN is proposed in [5], which is based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) and self-certified public key technique
incorporating self-certificate. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography
is used as a primitive for the encryption. This is an asymmetric
key scheme with the natural advantage to be robust against
impersonation attack. It also has the advantage of using a
much lower encryption key length to provide an equivalent
security result as compare to the public-key encryption. We
will compare our proposed scheme with that in [5].
Here we analyze our proposed scheme in terms of the
computational and storage overhead. As for storage, each and
every end node is loaded with its identification (ID), the
multiplicative group parameter (Z∗q , q, a) and the hash function
H . With MD5 as hash function and 128 bits for each element
of the multiplicative group as well as the identification, the
whole storage requirement will not exceed 1M bits.
As for computation, it mainly emphasizes on evaluating
the encryption, decryption and hash function operations in
the pairwise key agreement and group key derivation. The
computation performance on per node basis as compared with
SE-HAN in [5] are shown in Table I. We also calculated the
round complexity, where defined as the number of message
exchanged. The round complexity of the proposed protocol is 4
(see Table I). It can be seen that our proposed scheme performs
better in terms of the computational and storage overhead.
Furthermore, in this paper, we provide detailed procedures on
key renewal and key revocation, which are not discussed in [5].
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION COMPARISON
Sym Sym Public Public Hash Comm
Key Key Key Key
Enc Dec Enc Dec
SE −HAN [5] 1 1 0 0 6 6
Proposed 1 1 0 0 4 4
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A light-weight key distribution and management scheme is
proposed for the Home Area Network (HAN), which is one
of the key component in the communication infrastructure
of the Advance Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The scheme
is shown to provide the integrity, privacy and authenticity
in the HAN, without which the trustworthiness of the AMI
will be questionable to every user of the grid. Although the
proposed scheme targets the HAN, similar methodology may
be extended to the remaining part of the AMI, and this will
be our next effort.
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